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Abstract
Nature shows as human beings live and grow inside social structures. This assumption
allows us to explain and explore how it may shape most of our behaviours and choices, and
why we are not just blindly driven by instincts: our decisions are based on more complex
cognitive reasons, based on our connectedness on different spaces. Thus, human coopera-
tion emerges from this complex nature of social network. Our paper, focusing on the evolu-
tionary dynamics, is intended to explore how and why it happens, and what kind of impact is
caused by homophily among people. We investigate the evolution of human cooperation
using evolutionary game theory on multiplex. Multiplexity, as an extra dimension of analysis,
allows us to unveil the hidden dynamics and observe non-trivial patterns within a population
across network layers. More importantly, we find a striking role of homophily, as the higher
the homophily between individuals, the quicker is the convergence towards cooperation in
the social dilemma. The simulation results, conducted both macroscopically and microscop-
ically across the network layers in the multiplex, show quantitatively the role of homophily in
human cooperation.
Introduction
Charles Darwin observed how animals, from ants to people, interacting each other, are able
to create social groups in which most of them work together for common good. By the way, it
was in contrast with his idea of individual fitness surviving over the long term [1, 2]. This
altruistic behaviour could be justified among kin in the natural selection mechanism. In [3],
the authors explain that kin selection is conditioned by “kin recognition”, as an individual
recognizes kin and behaves accordingly. Much research effort has been done in exploring this
behaviour, but the understanding of how and why it may work out and evolve among people,
linked by every type of relation, remains an open and major challenge. It raises the conun-
drum of cooperation, a widespread phenomenon in natural and social systems [4] but not
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fully-understood mainly due to its complexity. Cooperation produces a human conflict
between the benefit of the single individual and that one of the population, such as risking
one’s life to save a stranger. The reason why people do something for someone else, cooperat-
ing or helping, even though there is often a low probability for direct reciprocity or socially
reward, is that actions are contagious [5].
Humans tend to cooperate building complex societies, as well as predators hunt in groups
to catch more preys as possible [6]. More in general, cooperating means to contribute towards
a common good at a cost to themselves, providing a benefit for others. Many models and
mechanisms have been proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation, nevertheless, only
by studying interactions inside population, we are able to explain the hidden patterns leading
to cooperation [7, 8]. Cooperation may induce assortative interactions among individuals,
transforming it into the most profitable strategy [9, 10].
Previous works on evolution of cooperation have identified some mechanisms, other than
kin selection [11], related to interactions among individuals which can favour it, such as direct
reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, spatial selection, and multilevel selection [12]. Direct reciproc-
ity is related to a cost of cooperating in order to obtain a gain in the near future. Indirect reci-
procity involves the dependence of an individual’s actions from the previous behaviours of the
others. Spatial selection is linked with interactions and clusters of cooperators. Multilevel selec-
tion refers to competition existing between groups and between individuals. Rand and Nowak
in [3] underline the importance to distinguish between interaction patterns that are mecha-
nisms for the evolution of cooperation and behaviours that require an evolutionary explanation
such as strong reciprocity, upstream reciprocity, and parochial altruism.
Therefore, how did the selfish process of natural selection give rise to cooperation? how
might social interactions can give a boost to cooperative behaviour? And what may be the
role of a linkage polarizer, such as homophily, in this evolutionary process? The evolution of
cooperation among individuals is an unsolved puzzle: it has being observed since ancient
times but, only in the recent years, a lot of research efforts have been done trying to under-
stand and deepening the origin inside social networks. A vast literature on the evolution of
cooperation on complex networks [13–16] highlights many aspects which offer insights on
how cooperation can evolve and survive in different scenarios [17–21]. To study cooperation
and its evolutionary dynamics, we need to understand the impact of the structure and the
nature of social relationships among individuals. The study of network properties and
dynamics is the result of a growing research interest in all the aspects related to social net-
works, from extracted data to emerging behaviours [22–25]. Therefore, both the structural
and behavioural dimensions are fundamental to analyse what is the origin of the observed
social dynamics within a population [26]. Social network analysis is intended to deepen the
nature of nodes and ties [27], the actions and interactions between them and all the features
and behaviours emerging from the combination of both aspects. These structural and beha-
vioural dimensions allow to unveil the social contagion dynamics [28–31], showing how the
influence runs through the ties connecting nodes, with regards to several phenomena at a
population scale, such as diseases, smoking, happiness, etc. [32]. Then, network thinking is
central in the analysis of contagion processes [33].
Social ties are crucial for collective action [34]. In [35] the authors have formalized the prob-
lem of collective action of large groups towards cooperative and uncooperative behaviours,
considering how the role of a single actor or a group of people, community or coalition, could
trigger a dynamic action within a population, which could represent a social contagion process.
The most well-known theory of critical mass in the social sciences, is that by Granovetter [36],
by considering people that have to make a binary choice, for instance, whether to join a protest
or not, or whether to cooperate or not. In particular, it is argued that the large group problem
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can be solved by introducing the concept of critical mass, intended as the minimum number of
initial contributors, whose efforts can produce a bandwagon effect, which has the power to
involve the rest of population, for example, persuading the remaining members of the popula-
tion towards the adoption of a specific behaviour [35]. Therefore, starting from a minority
[37], the question is how many people should be involved in a collective action such that a sin-
gle individual, interacting with them, becomes more likely to join the action? The answer is
that each individual has his own threshold in terms of how many other people connected with
him should join the action before he will do the same.
The actions of the nodes could be affected by a huge number of factors, among them one
of the most important is the role played by homophily. The concept of homophily, that is the
principle that similarity breeds connection, can explain how social connections are forged
and severed over time [38]. In [39], the authors define homophily, in terms of information
consumed and rumors spreading, as the tendency to interact with users and have similar con-
sumption patterns. Homophily has been introduced and investigated in several works and
across various domains [40–42] from friendship to information transfer. This concept gener-
ates some interesting behaviours observed in nature, shaping social relationships with a sig-
nificant impact on information sharing, influence dynamics, and all the interactions people
form and experience. Following this tendency to associate with others who are similar to
them, we observe that a contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate that among
dissimilar; in terms of social networks, this simply means that the attributes of vertices corre-
late across edges and it is known as assortative mixing. Among the various aspects of homo-
phily, cognitive homophily is referred to the similarity in interests, beliefs, which can
represent a reason towards a choice. People select each other because they share a similar
representation of reality, strengthening some contacts rather than others. Nevertheless, other
studies in the social sciences have pointed in the opposite direction, e.g. organizational ecolo-
gists have suggested that similarity can lead to competition for scarce resources [43], there-
fore competition among organizations using similar strategies, of similar size, and in
geographical proximity with one another tends to be stronger than competition among dis-
similar organizations [44, 45].
Furthermore, it is crucial to distinguish between homophily, social dependence and social
influence. Homophily means that similar nodes are more likely to contact. Social dependence
means that nodes exchange resources in order to satisfy their goals. Social influence means that
nodes which interact become more similar.
Homophily or assortative mixing, however, is only a statement of pattern, and does not say
much about the underlying mechanism. For example, if we observe a pattern of homophily in a
social network, e.g., on political beliefs or socioeconomic status, we generally cannot distin-
guish between the edge forming as a result of the similar attributes, or the attributes becoming
more similar as a result of the edge. The concept of homophily is important in the dynamics of
collective action and critical mass mobilization [35]. Therefore, despite a lot of research efforts
in studying the role of homophily in different fields [46], there is still much work to be done in
studying its real effect on the evolution of social behaviours within a population.
From the other hand, homophily alone cannot explain why we connect or choose a strat-
egy when interact with others, so it becomes essential considering the multiple types of rela-
tionships between nodes, known as multiplexity. In fact, the constituents of a huge variety of
real-world complex systems, such as social networks, interact with each other following com-
plicated patterns. Therefore multiplexity allows us to encompass these several interactions
and relationships, exploring and unveiling how the different ties in the various layers can
impact on the diffusion of social behaviours within a population. The presence of nodes in
multiple layers of a system is the key to understand emergent phenomena, adding an extra
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dimension explaining what is the role not only of the intralayer interactions, as in a monoplex
framework, but also of interlayer interactions for the emergence of these phenomena. Multi-
plex networks consist of multiple channels of connectivity, and they provide the more natural
description for systems in which entities have a different set of neighbours in each layer [47]
(see Fig 1).
In the social networks, these layers may correspond to different types of relationships: kin,
co-workers, friends, etc. A fundamental aspect of describing multiplex networks is to quantify
the interconnectivity between the different types of connections. In fact, interlayer connections
can generate new structural and dynamical correlations between components of a system, and
it is important to take them into account [48]. Multiplex networks are not just a particular case
of interdependent networks [49], in fact, as in multiplex systems, many or even all of the nodes
have a counterpart in each layer, so one can associate a vector of states to each node. In the
multiplex case, the presence of nodes in multiple layers of a system also entails the possibility
of self-interactions. This feature is absent in interdependent networks, which were generated as
interconnected communities within a single, larger network [50–52]. In multiplex framework,
being the same node at different layers has deep dynamical consequences and give rise to unex-
pected emergent phenomena [53].
To understand the evolution of social behaviours and, in particular, the emergence of
human cooperation within a population in networks, it is important to have a mathematical
framework to capture these underlying mechanisms. Fortunately, Evolutionary Game Theory
(EGT) has provided a powerful framework to investigate cooperative behaviour in systems
consisting of competitive individuals [54–56]. EGT allows to study interactions of multiple
nodes in a population, and find out the hidden dynamics, shedding light on how and why
some behaviours emerge following a specific pattern. Among the classical games, we consider
the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG), that is one of the most common paradigms used to
describe and study the problem of evolution [57, 58].
The investigation of evolutionary dynamics through EGT on multiplex networks allows
unveiling and studying the existing social conflicts and dilemmas among the interests of the
single nodes and groups, their counterparts in various layers, not neglecting what is captured
from homophily, the patterns of similarity and dissimilarity [6, 59].
In this work, we targeted at investigating the evolutionary dynamics of human cooperation
dilemma considering the multiplexity of interactions between nodes.
To explore the nature of human cooperation, we take into account a Critical Mass [34, 35],
able to pop up a new behaviour and trigger a collective action within a population. To analyse
the contagiousness of the action [28], we investigate the social connectedness, using a multiplex
evolutionary game theory framework [59] and bringing out the real reason why similarity
breeds connection [38]. Therefore, we focus on both the role of homophily and multiplexity
[60, 61], stressing also the importance of the coupling between layers using the communicabil-
ity function inside the multiplex network [62]. Taking into account all these aspects, we pro-
pose a novel analytical model and simulate the evolution of human cooperation using
evolutionary game theory.
Our work, coherently with [6, 59], is intended to analyse the problem of the emergence of
cooperation in multiplex networks using EGT. Our findings highlight the key role played by
homophily and multiplexity in the evolution of cooperation. In fact, despite the apparently
constrained nature of homophily in reducing the boundaries of connectedness, homophily
allows to observe a new nature of the interaction patterns people experience, looking at these
patterns through multiplexity.
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Fig 1. Schematic example of a multiplex network. The multiplex is made of N = 5 nodes embedded within M = 3 layers, each one containing 3 links. The
size of nodes is proportional to centrality measure. The dashed lines represent interlayer connections, while the continuous lined represent the intra-layer
connections.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0140646.g001
Quantifying Homophily in Human Cooperation Using Multiplex EGT
PLOSONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0140646 October 23, 2015 5 / 21
Materials and Methods
Critical Mass, Centrality and Homophily in Multiplex Network
Critical mass is defined as the minimum coalitionmin(n), such that if actors organize into coa-
litions of size n, at least n people will prefer mutual cooperation to unilateral defection, and it is
calculated as follows [35]:
minðnÞ s:t:
XN
i¼1
HðRi  TiÞ
( )
 n ð1Þ
where n is the overall population andmin(n) is the minimum coalition size. The latter depends
on the Heaviside function of the difference between Reward and Temptation payoffs, Ri and Ti
respectively, evaluated considering different types of games [35].
In this work we extend the concept of Critical Mass introducing a social network approach,
considering a scale-free network [63], and taking into account centrality and homophily mea-
sures in a multiplex structure. Furthermore, we aim not only to evaluate the minimum coali-
tion size, but also to define a new kind of “Critical Mass” (CM), as the minimum information
enclosed in one or more nodes’ configurations able to trigger a diffusion process of a behaviour
within a population. This represents the role of CM for investigating the human cooperation.
The idea is to observe and track the diffusion of behaviours between connected nodes using a
multiplex approach.
We take into account a scale-free network, thus CM is transformed into a set of nodes that
depends on the network structure taking into account centrality. In particular, we choose the
eigenvector-like centrality measure, which is defined in [64]. The eigenvector-like centrality
allows to include the concept of influence in our analysis; starting from the spectral properties
of the adjacency matrix, considers not only the number of links of each node, but also the qual-
ity of such connections. Central nodes are the most influential nodes which can condition the
behaviours of their neighbouring nodes. In Fig 2 we show the centrality measures and its distri-
bution in the multiplex network.
The analysis of CM is then further extended considering a multiplex structureM, taking a
different eigenvector-like centrality measure in each layer α, in order to consider different
degrees of importance (or influence) in different layers of the network, and to include this infor-
mation in the definition of a matrix of mutual influence between layers. Thus, to calculate the
centrality of a node within a specific layer, one must take into account all the other layers, as it
may depends not only on the neighbours that are linked to xα within that layer, but also on all
other neighbours of xβ that belong to the other layers. In other words, one needs to consider the
situation where the influence amongst layers is heterogeneous. To this aim, one can introduce
an influence matrixW, defined as a non-negative matrix, such thatWαβmeasures the influence
on a layer α given by the layer β. Given a multiplex networkM and an influence matrixW =
(wαβ), we define the global heterogeneous eigenvector-like centrality ofM as in [65].
For each layer α, we introduce the adjacency matrix, denoted by Aa 2 RNN , where each ele-
ment is:
aaxy ¼ aayx ¼
1; if x and y are connected
0; otherwise
(
; for 1  a  M ð2Þ
Now we extend the homophily measure considering a multiplex structure. In each layer α,
we define an Homophily matrix Hα, where each element haxy represents the homophily measure
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between two nodes x and y in the layer α, calculated as:
haxy ¼
1
1þ daxy
where δxy measures the homophily difference between two nodes x and y. Then, the Homo-
phily matrix is defined as follows:
Ha ¼
1    1
1þ da1;N
..
. . .
. ..
.
1
1þ daN;1
   1
2
66666664
3
77777775
2 RNN ð3Þ
Fig 2. Centrality distribution in the multiplex network. The multiplex is made of N = 1000 nodes embedded withinM = 3 layers, each one modelled by a
different scale-free network. The size of nodes is proportional to centrality measure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0140646.g002
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For each layer α, we define the matrix Zα, as the Hadamard product between the homophily
matrix Hα and the adjacency matrix Aα, as follows:
Za ¼ Ha  Aa ¼
0    a
a
1;N
1þ da1;N
..
. . .
. ..
.
aaN;1
1þ daN;1
   0
2
66666664
3
77777775
2 RNN ð4Þ
where each element is given by:
zaxy ¼
aaxy
1þ daxy
Note that Zα degenerates in the adjacency matrix Aα if, for each pair of nodes, we have
daxy ¼ 0, that is a network with no homophily difference between nodes. In order to obtain an
overall measure that includes both the concepts of centrality and homophily in the multiplex
structure, in a first step we need to evaluate the global heterogeneous eigenvector-like centrality
and homophily of the multiplexM, defined as a positive and normalized eigenvector o 2 RNM
(if it exists) of the matrix:
Z ¼
w11 ðZ1ÞT w12 ðZ2ÞT    w1M ðZMÞT
w21 ðZ1ÞT w22 ðZ2ÞT    w2M ðZMÞT
..
. ..
. . .
. ..
.
wM1 ðZ1ÞT wM2 ðZ2ÞT    wMM ðZMÞT
2
666664
3
777775 2 R
ðNMÞðNMÞ ð5Þ
where Z is the Khatri–Rao product of the matrices:
W ¼
w11 w12    w1M
w21 w22    w2M
..
. ..
. . .
. ..
.
wM1 wM2    wMM
2
666664
3
777775 ð6Þ
and
ZT ¼ ðZ1ÞT ðZ2ÞT    ðZMÞT
  ð7Þ
Note that we consider a symmetric homophily measure between two different nodes, that is
δxy = δyx. In other words, we consider realistically that, in terms of similarity, two connected
nodes present a symmetric measure, so that: (Zα)T = Zα.
Introducing the following notation:
o ¼
o1
o2
..
.
oM
2
666664
3
777775 2 R
NM ð8Þ
where o1; o2;    ; oa;    ; oM 2 RN , we can define the global heterogeneous
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eigenvector-like matrix O ofM, as follows:
O ¼ o1 o2    oM 	 2 RNM ð9Þ½
Once defined Eq (9), in a second step, for each node x, we define an overall measure of its
centrality and homophily, denoted by λx, in the multiplex networkM. Λ is a column vector of
size N, which includes all the measures λx. It allows to quantify the overall weight, in terms of
centrality and homophily, of each node in the multiplexM, as follows:
L ¼
l1
l2
..
.
lN
2
666664
3
777775 ¼
PM
i¼1 ðoiÞ1PM
i¼1 ðoiÞ2
..
.
PM
i¼1 ðoiÞN
2
6666664
3
7777775
2 RN ð10Þ
Note that:
XN
x¼1
lx ¼ 1
Now we want to define the CM in the multiplex structure both in a quantitative and qualita-
tively way. To this purpose, on one hand, we evaluate the minimum coalition size n and, on the
other hand, we also identify the nodes which maximize the diffusion process of a behaviour
within a population of size N.
First we consider the multiplex as a single layer of N ×M nodes, and we calculate the CM
size n, as follows:
minðnÞ s:t:
XNM
i¼1
H ðRi  TiÞ
 !
 n ð11Þ
We identify a node as “critical” when it triggers a certain behaviour in all the layers in which
it is involved. Therefore, the CM results in a set of “critical” nodes able to give a boost to a cer-
tain behaviour in a more effective and faster way, due to its high centrality and homophily
weight. In fact, more a node is central in the network structure and more it is similar to the
other nodes in the different layers of the multiplex structure, more it becomes relevant in trig-
gering a behaviour.
Therefore, assumed that in the multiplex network a “critical” node adopts the same behav-
iour in all the layers, starting from Eq (11) and considering a multiplex network, the CM size n
ofM is given by:
n ¼ n
M
 n ð12Þ
as we can exclude the replicas of a node that belongs to the set of CM nodes. In other words, n
is the CM size of the “aggregate layer”, obtained considering in a single layer all the connections
in the different layers and the nodes in the multiplex (including its counterparts in the different
layers of the multiplex). Therefore, the definition of n allows us to leave out the critical nodes’
counterparts from the CM size.
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We define the Critical Mass density, denoted by τCM, as follows:
tCM ¼
n
N
ð13Þ
In Fig 3 we show the CM density τCM according to the population of size N and the number
of layersM. The plots are generated considering a population N ranging from 5000 nodes to
30000 nodes, and a number of layersM ranging from one layer to seven layers.
The boundaries of the variation ranges related to the variables N andM are due to the con-
vergence process of the τCM to a limit value denoted by tCM . In fact, although increasing the
size of the “aggregate layer”, τCMmaintains nearly the same value:
lim
NM!þ1
tCM ¼ tCM ð14Þ
The plot highlights how the τCM decreases with the population and the number of layers in
the considered variation intervals. Thus, these findings shed light on the significance of the
inequality.
To identify qualitatively the set of CM nodes, we take into account the set R, representing all
the permutations Sk of the n nodes in the population N, so that we overall have N!=n!
permutations.
Fig 3. Critical mass density. The Critical Mass Density as a function of the population’s sizeN and the number of layersM.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0140646.g003
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The set R is defined as follows:
R ¼ fS1; S2; :::SN!=n !g ð15Þ
For each subset Sk of R, we can define an overall centrality and homophily measure, as fol-
lows:
LSk ¼
X
x2Sk
lx ð16Þ
The CM in the multiplex structureM, indicated with S, is the subset which maximizes the
overall centrality and homophily measure, that is LS , as follows:
S 2 R s:t: LS ¼ arg max
S2R
X
x2S
lx
( )
ð17Þ
Note that it may be more than one subset that satisfy the Eq 17. Furthermore, from a
computational point of view, calculating S is simple, since we have only to consider the n
nodes with the higher values of λx.
Communicability in Multiplex
In our work, we want to stress the importance of the coupling between layers in exploring the
evolution of behaviours in the multiplex structure. To this aim we exploit the communicability
function defined in [62], which quantifies the number of possible routes that two nodes have to
communicate with each other.
Therefore, considering a multiplex formed byM layers, denoted by L1, L2, . . ., LM, and their
respective matrices Z1, Z2, . . ., ZM, representing the Hadamard product between the homophily
matrices and the adjacency matrices of the multiplexM, its matrix is then given by M = ZL +
CLL, where ZL is:
ZL ¼ 
Ma¼1Za ð18Þ
and CLL is a matrix describing the interlayer interaction, defined as follows:
CLL ¼
0 C12 ::: C1M
C21 0 ::: C2M
..
. ..
. . .
. ..
.
CM1 CM2 ::: 0
2
666664
3
777775 2 R
NMNM ð19Þ
where each element Cab 2 RNN represents the interaction of layer α with layer β. Here it is
assumed that: Cαβ = Cβα = C = ωαβ I = ωβα I, for all layers α and β, as we consider a symmetric
interaction between layers. ω is the parameter describing the strength of the interlayer interac-
tion, and I 2 RNN is the corresponding identity matrix. So we can now explain the multiplex
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matrix as follow:
M ¼
Z1 o12I ::: o1MI
o21I Z2 ::: o2MI
..
. ..
. . .
. ..
.
oM1I oM2I ::: ZM
2
666664
3
777775 2 R
NMNM ð20Þ
Since we are interested in accounting for all the walks between any pair of nodes in the mul-
tiplex, we consider the number of walks of length k between two generic nodes x and y in the
multiplex, which is given by the α, β-entry of the K-th power of the adjacency matrix of the net-
work. Consequently, the walks of k length in the multiplex are given by the different entries of
MK. As underlined in [62], the walks can include hops of two different kinds, e.g., intra-layer
and interlayer hops, and we are interested in giving more weight to the shortest walks than to
the longer ones. The communicability between two nodes x and y in the multiplex is given by a
weighted sum of all walks from x to y as follows:
Gxy ¼ I þMþ
M2
2!
þ ::: ¼
X1
k¼0
Mk
k!
¼ ½expðZL þ CLLÞ	xy ð21Þ
Now we introduce the communicability matrix G, where each element Gab 2 RNN is the
matrix representing the communicability between every pair of nodes belonging to two differ-
ent layers α and β, of the multiplexM. It is defined as follows:
G ¼ expðZL þ CLLÞ ¼
G11 G12 ::: G1M
G21 G22 ::: G2M
..
. ..
. . .
. ..
.
GM1 GM2 ::: GMM
2
666664
3
777775 2 R
NMNM ð22Þ
In particular, [Gαβ]xy represents the communicability between the node x in the layer α and
the node y in the layer β.
Evolutionary Dynamics
We use the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PDG) as a general metaphor for studying the evolution
of cooperation. In this classical social dilemma, two players simultaneously decide whether to
cooperate (C) or to defect (D): cooperation results in a benefit b to the opposing player, but
incurs a cost c to the cooperator (where b> c> 0); defection has no costs or benefits. In both
cases, it is best to defect for rational individuals in a single round of the PDG, regardless of the
opponent strategy. However, mutual cooperation leads to a higher payoff than mutual defec-
tion, but cooperation is irrational. The social dilemma is thus established, since mutual cooper-
ation yields both an individual and total benefit higher than that of mutual defection. The
payoff matrix of the PDG is illustrated in Table 1:
Table 1. Payoff Matrices of the Prisoner’s DilemmaGame.
Cooperate Defect
Payoff to Cooperation b − c −c
Payoff to Defection b 0
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0140646.t001
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In evolutionary settings, payoffs determine reproductive fitness, and it follows that D is the
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS). This can be formalized using replicator dynamics [56],
which admits pure defection as the only stable equilibrium. The PD game is in fact the most
stringent cooperative dilemma where, for cooperation to arise, a mechanism for the evolution
of cooperation is needed [66]. The pairwise nature of the game is translated to a population
scale by making the nodes playing with each other, and accumulating the payoff obtained from
each interaction. After each round of the game, the strategies of the nodes are updated so that
those nodes with less payoff are tempted to imitate the strategy of those fittest individuals. We
focus on memory-one game since in [67] the authors have proved that, giving only a finite
memory of previous play, the payoff obtained is exactly the same as if we would consider a
player with a longer memory. In unstructured populations, in which players are well-mixed,
evolutionary dynamics leads all the individuals to defection [65]. However, the existence of a
network of interactions, so that each node can only play with those directly connected to it, the
population can sometimes promote the emergence of cooperation. This mechanism promoting
cooperation, known as network reciprocity [68, 69], was observed to be substantially enhanced
when the network substrate is a scale-free network [13, 66], a real-world network, with a power
law dependence of the degree distribution P(k)* kγ, with the exponent γ typically satisfying 2
< γ< 3. For this reason, we decide to adopt a scale-free as network substrate [63].
We simulate the evolutionary process in accordance with the standard Monte Carlo simula-
tion procedure, composed of elementary steps; including the distribution of competing strate-
gies, which is an elementary step entails randomly selecting a player and one of its neighbours,
calculating the payoffs of both players, and finally attempting a strategy adoption. First, a ran-
domly selected player x acquires its payoff Px by playing the game with all its neighbours on
the layer α. Next, player x randomly chooses one neighbour y on the layer β, who then also
acquires its payoff Py on the layer β in the same way as previously did player x. Lastly, player x
adopts the strategy Sy from player y with a probability determined by the Fermi function [70]:
WðSy ! SxÞ ¼ Zx
1
1þ exp PxPydxyK
h i ð23Þ
One player x on the layer α of the multiplexM adopts the strategy Sy of another node play-
ing on the layer β, taking into account the payoff difference, the homophily measure δxy and a
communicability measure ηx in the multiplex network. We take into account a degree of uncer-
tainty in the decision making process given by the factor K. In fact, the temperature K repre-
sents a noise level (or selection intensity) and quantifies the uncertainty related to the strategy
adoption process; it can vary in the range [0, +1]. The selected value of K is a traditional and
frequently employed choice that does not qualitatively affect the evolutionary outcomes, as
shown in many preceding works and reviewed comprehensively in [71]. In the K! 0 limit, the
adoption of a successful strategy is deterministic, while in the K! +1 limit, the strategy learn-
ing is blind. The factor δxy, related to the homophily measure, means that the more the players
have a high value, the more one player tends to imitate the strategy of the other one at each
round. δxy can vary in the range [0, +1]; in particular for δxy! 0, the two nodes present the
highest homophily value, while in the δxy! +1 limit, there is no homophily. Furthermore, we
introduce the scaling factor ηx of player x which depends on the strategies of related players
from the other layers, and it is the key quantity that takes into account the communicability
function between layers [15]. If we consider only the strategy of the counterpart x0 on another
layer β, we are in the simplest case and we can assume that ηx is minimal if Sx = Sx0, otherwise it
assumes the maximal value. To avoid frozen states the scaling factor ranges in the interval [0.1,
1], assuming ηxmin = 0.1 as the minimal scaling factor and ηxmax = 1 as the maximal value.
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In our definition, we consider a more general case where not only the counterpart node x0
but also its neighbours on the other layer β determine ηx; in other words, the counterpart and
its neighbours can influence the strategy adoption due to the communicability, that includes
the interlayer interaction and the number of possible walks from node x to y, where y are all
the neighbouring nodes connected with the counterpart node x0 on the layer β of the node x on
the layer α.
The scaling factor ηx changes linearly between ηxmin and ηxmax in accordance with:
Zx ¼ 1 ðZxmax  ZxminÞ
P
y2b;Sy¼Sx ½Gab	xyP
y2b½Gab	xy
ð24Þ
where the numerator is the sum of the communicability functions calculated between the node
x on the layer α and all the neighbouring nodes y belonging to the layer β, adopting the same
strategy as player x. While the denominator represents the sum of the communicability func-
tions calculated between the node x on the layer α and all the neighbouring nodes y belonging
to the layer β. Therefore, the ratio quantifies the influence, in terms of communicability, on the
strategy adoption of the player x on the layer α, due to the strategies adopted by the counterpart
node and its neighbours on the layer β. In particular, more are players on the layer β with a
high communicability with the node x adopting the same strategy as player x, more likely x will
adopt the same strategy in the next round. On the other hand, if there are nodes on the layer β
with a high communicability, but adopting a different strategy, the player x will be most likely
pushed to change its strategy. Thus, this ratio depends on the communicability function and it
may result in a bias regarding the strategy adoption of the player x in the next round of the
game. Each Monte Carlo step gives a chance for every player to change its strategy once on
average.
Results and Discussion
The simulations have been conducted choosing a scale-free network with N = 1000 nodes. We
take into account different values of homophily randomly chosen following a normal distribu-
tion around a mean value, with standard deviation σ. Furthermore, we have considered two dif-
ferent values of interlayer interaction strength ωαβ; in particular, ωαβ = 0.3 indicates a low
interlayer interaction strength between the layers 1 and 3, while ωαβ = 0.6 represents a high
interlayer interaction strength between the layers 2 and the others. The reasons behind our
choice of the interlayer interaction strength between layers are explained in Fig 4.
Fig 5 shows the fraction (or density) of cooperative nodes against the rounds or time steps. ρ
varies in the range [0, 1], where 0 corresponds to the global defection, while 1 means a global
cooperation of population. We have simulated the evolutionary dynamics for a fixed number
of simulations, and the colour corresponds to the population’s density, so ‘red’ indicates the
highest density, while ‘blue’ means the lowest density. In Fig 5, the PD game is played between
the interacting nodes in a multiplex network withM = 3 layers. We have considered two differ-
ent values of σ, where σ = 8 means a low homophily value (Fig 5A), while σ = 1 means a higher
homophily value (Fig 5B), fixed a CM value. We show the evolution of cooperation until 200
rounds as, in correspondence of that value, the convergence has already been reached.
This macroscopic evolution highlights how the higher is the homophily value, more quickly
nodes converge to cooperation and the density of cooperative nodes tends to the maximum
value. In other words, increasing the homophily value of the multiplex networkM, we note a
faster emergence of cooperation. Instead, considering lower homophily values, we find a lower
density of cooperative nodes, that means a slower convergence to cooperation. The results are
coherent with our theoretical expectations: in fact the more the homophily, the more the nodes
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tend to choose the same cooperative strategy, solving the social dilemma towards the most profit-
able strategy with the highest payoff for the evolutionary fitness of population. The switching
from the pure rational strategy to the most profitable one is due to the interaction between nodes
through the different layers of the multiplex network, creating a sort of ‘learning process’ driven
by homophily, which acts as a catalyst towards cooperation. In Fig 6 we illustrate the microscopic
Fig 4. Evolution of cooperation considering different interlayer interaction strength. The evolution of cooperation against the round as a function of
interlayer interaction strength. The ‘blue’ plot represents the case of constant interlayer strength:ωαβ = 0.4. The ‘red’ plot represents the case of variable
interlayer strength (one dominant layer):ωαβ = 0.3 between layers 1 and 3;ωαβ = 0.6 between the layer 2 and the other layers of the multiplex. We show the
evolution of cooperation until 200 rounds as, in correspondence of that value, the convergence has already been reached. It can be observed that the
emergence of cooperation is quicker considering a variable interlayer strength (one dominant layer), than the constant case. The dominant layer acts as a
behaviour’s polarizer of the nodes in the other layers.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0140646.g004
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Fig 5. Emergence of cooperation over time. The figure illustrates the fraction of cooperative nodes against the rounds or time steps: low homophily (A) and
high homophily (B). The figure shows the evolutionary dynamics of the PD game played between the interacting nodes in a multiplex network withM = 3
layers. In both cases N = 1000 nodes. The results are obtained choosing a fixed number of simulations and the colour corresponds to the density: ‘red’
indicates the highest density (that is the maximum number of overlapping points), while ‘blue’means the lowest density. As can be observed, increasing the
homophily value of the multiplex networkM, we note a faster emergence of cooperation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0140646.g005
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evolution of cooperation, considering both the cases, respectively with low homophily (σ = 8)
and high homophily value (σ = 1). We have simulated the evolution of cooperation in the multi-
plex network, showing the evolutionary dynamics of one of the layers, as the evolution in one
layer is representative of the overall one in all the layers of the multiplex.
Fig 6. Temporal evolution of cooperation. The figure highlights the microscopic emergence of cooperation
in the evolutionary process. The formation of cooperative groups in the network and also the group size
depend on the homophily value. Figs A, B, C—in the low homophily case (σ = 8), the defective behaviour
tends to persist more in the population, not favouring the formation of cooperative groups and globally
slowing the emergence of cooperation. Yet, the group size will be smaller in this case of low homophily. Figs
D, E, F—in the high homophily case (σ = 1), the convergence towards cooperation becomes quicker, and
there is a natural formation of larger cooperative groups than in low homophily case. Analysing the
corresponding figures of the evolution, we see clearly this difference, both in speed and size, in the formation
of cooperative groups.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0140646.g006
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During the steps of evolutionary dynamics, the nodes becomes coloured when they cooper-
ate, otherwise they are ‘white’. In particular, we coloured in ‘blue’ the cooperative nodes in the
case of low homophily σ = 8, while we indicated with ‘red’ the case of high homophily σ = 1.
The size of nodes are log-proportional to the values of Λ (see Eq 10), so it depends on both the
centrality and homophily measures of the multiplex network (see Materials and Methods). As
in Fig 5, the Fig 6 highlights the different speed in the emergence of cooperation of the evolu-
tionary process. The formation of cooperative groups in the different parts of the network and
also the group size depend on the homophily value. When we consider a low homophily value,
nodes tend not to interact with the others in the multiplex network, then the defective behav-
iour tends to persist more in the population, not favouring the formation of cooperative groups
and globally slowing the emergence of cooperation. As a consequence, the group size will be
small in this case of low homophily (see Fig 6A, 6B and 6C). Instead, when we consider a high
homophily value, nodes are pushed to interact with each other, so the convergence towards
cooperation becomes quicker, and there is a natural formation of larger cooperative groups
than in low homophily case (see Fig 6D, 6E and 6F). Analysing concurrently the corresponding
figures of microscopic evolution, we see clearly this difference, both in speed and size, in the
formation of cooperative groups. In both cases of respectively low and high homophily, we
illustrate the evolutionary process until the convergence has already been reached.
To sum up, starting from [6, 59], we analysed the emergence of cooperation in multiplex
networks. To this aim, we defined a novel analytical model able to analyse the problem of
human cooperation in multiplex networks using evolutionary game theory, exploring the role
played by multiplexity and homophily in the evolution of cooperation. Therefore, first we have
introduced the critical mass in a multiplex network, proposing also the selection criterion to
detect nodes to trigger the evolution. To capture the effect of multiplexity and stress the impor-
tance of the coupling between the network layers, we have exploited the communicability func-
tion defined in [62]. We observed how the emergence of cooperation is quicker considering a
variable interlayer strength in the different layers, with one dominant layer, than the constant
case with the same interlayer strength. This have suggested us that the dominant layer acts as a
behaviour’s polarizer of the nodes in the other layers. We have redesigned the study of evolu-
tion considering the homophily as a shaping factor. In particular, we have studied its crucial
role in breeding connections and rules interactions within a population, and then influence the
strategies of players in multiplex. After having included these concepts of mutiplexity, commu-
nicability and homophily in our model, we have investigated the evolutionary dynamics both
at macroscopic and microscopic scales. From one hand, the macroscopic evolution have
highlighted the crucial role of homophily in solving the social dilemma, moving the population
from the pure rational strategy (defection) towards the most profitable strategy with the highest
evolutionary fitness (cooperation). From the other hand, the microscopic evolution has
pointed out the impact of homophily on the formation of cooperative groups in the network
and on groups’ size. The results have shown as homophily significantly affects the formation of
cooperative groups, both in speed and size. Then, the introduction of multiplexity and homo-
phily not only is a more realistic representation of social systems but, as shown in this work, it
has a key effect on the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation.
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